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There are traffic situations (e.g. incorrect speeding tickets) in which a given vehicle’s driving behavior at some 
point in time has to be proved to a third party. Vehicle-mounted sensorial devices are not suitable for this matter 
since they can be maliciously manipulated. However, surrounding vehicles may give their vision on another 
one’s behavior. Furthermore, these data may be shared with the affected vehicle through VANETs. In this paper, 
a VANET-enabled data exchange mechanism called WEVAN is presented. The goal of this mechanism is to 
build and verify evidences based on surrounding vehicles (called witnesses) testimonies. Due to the short-range 
nature of VANETs, the connectivity to witnesses may be reduced with time – the later their testimonies are 
requested, the lower the amount of witnesses may be. Simulation results show that if testimonies are ordered 5 
seconds later, an average of 38 testimonies may be collected in highway scenarios. Other intervals and road 
settings are studied as well. 
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1   Introduction 
Information technologies are being strongly improved in vehicular environments, leading to a new family of 
services collectively called Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). They are mainly based on sensors 
currently mounted on vehicles and a new communication network called Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork 
(VANET). 
This technological context may be the basis for non-safety related vehicular services. In particular, there are 
situations in which it is necessary for a driver to prove its recent driving behavior. Accidents and traffic offences 
are good examples. In case of an accident, it is useful to have an accurate behavior description to perform a fair 
liability attribution. Regarding traffic offences, this description may reveal that a purported illegal action (e.g. 
speeding, red-light crossing) was not committed. A natural data source for describing this behavior is the vehicle 
itself. This approach is present in previous contributions such as [1]. Nevertheless, in-vehicle sensors or their 
connecting buses can be tampered with. Several countermeasures have been proposed for both sensor and bus 
protection, but they are not widely implemented yet [2].  
Approach overview. An alternative data source about a driver behavior is needed. VANETs can be useful for 
this purpose. As part of the VANET regular operation, vehicles send each other a message called beacon. It 
contains the sender speed and location, among other data [3]. As a vehicle is aware of the recent driving behavior 
of nearby ones, the former could act as witness of the latter. For this purpose, vehicles can combine the beacon 
data with their in-vehicle sensor measurements [4].  
Using testimonies from other vehicles allows describing a given driver behavior in a more reliable way. An 
intuitive assumption is that a driver does not share any interest with others circulating around. Thus, there is no 
reason for a witness to lie in favour of the affected driver. Moreover, even if subornation could always be 
performed, it could be countered by imposing legal consequences to false testimonies, as it happens with current 
ones. 
The challenge. Witness vehicles are reachable by the affected vehicle for a short time period, due to the 
restricted range of vehicular communications and the high mobility of vehicles. Therefore, the proposed 
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mechanism must allow witnesses to be inquired as soon as possible. Moreover, it has to deal with the 
unreliability of the wireless vehicular communication network. 
Our contribution. In this work, a Witness-based Evidence generation protocol for Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks 
(WEVAN) is proposed. The evidence verification process is also described. It is applied to the scenario of 
defence against an offence notification, assuming that this notification is directly delivered to the vehicle. Its 
suitability for vehicular networks and computational devices is analysed. Moreover, the amount of available 
testimonies per evidence is also assessed through simulations. A previous result of this research line was already 
presented in [5]. However, the protocol presented herein outperforms the previous proposal in three main 
aspects: (1) it is based on an underlying enforcement process model, (2) it counters uncooperative behaviors by 
vehicles, and (3) it is evaluated taking into account realistic vehicular devices and networks, as well as different 
road traffic scenarios.  
Scope. Evidences and testimonies will be both referred to a single behavior-describing variable which may be 
detected or estimated by a nearby vehicle. Particularly, this work will only consider position and speed. On the 
other hand, only rational attackers will be considered. Irrational attackers like jammers (i.e. entities that smurf 
the network with bogus data) are considered to be already countermeasured, for example by local eviction of 
misbehaving nodes [6]. 
Paper outline. The model and architecture are presented in Sections 2 and 3, respectively. The protocol is 
described in Section 4 and evaluated in Section 5. The related work is described in Section 6. Section 7 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2   Model 
This Section describes the considered model for this contribution. Section 2.1 introduces the participant entities 
and their identified interaction models. Section 2.2 describes the requirements that the proposal has to fulfil. 
Finally, Section 2.3 describes the working assumptions. 
 
2.1 Participant entities 
The creation of evidences may be applied to the enforcement process. Therefore, the participant entities are a 
subset of those that make up the enforcement process model. For this contribution, the model proposed by de 
Fuentes et al. will be considered [7]. Particularly, five entities are related to this process, namely the Offending 
ITS-enabled vehicle, the CounterEvidence Analyser (CEA), the Designated-as-offender Contact Point (DCP), 
the Surrounding ITS-enabled vehicle and the Data Requester (DR). Thus, the Offending ITS-enabled vehicle 
will perform two actions. First, it will send to the Authority (specifically, CEA) its claim on its past behavior. 
For this purpose, DCP will be used as the intermediary of this communication. In this way, the Offending 
vehicle does not have to care the specific CEA that has to be contacted, which may depend on the internal 
organization of the enforcement infrastructure. 
The second action is to obtain the information (called testimonies) from surrounding vehicles. From the 
logical point of view, this interaction involves that at a certain point in time it is necessary to extract some 
information from these vehicles. These data are sent to CEA through DR. 
 
2.1.1 Identified interaction models 
 
There are three ways in which the identified entities may interact to perform the evidence generation process. 
They will be referred to as the centralized approach, the decentralized and the combined ones. In the first case, 
the Offending ITS-enabled vehicle relies on DR (which is seen as a single, central entity) to ask the Surrounding 
vehicles on behalf of the Offending one, to retrieve their information and to create the evidence. In the 
decentralized approach, it is the Offending ITS-enabled vehicle which asks for the Surrounding vehicle data, 
retrieves it and builds the evidence. In the combined one, it is the Offending vehicle who requests for 
testimonies, while DR collects them. The Offending vehicle then sends a summary of its expectations on the 
future evidence. Based on this summary, CEA (which receives the summary along with the data retrieved by 
DR) compiles the evidence and proceeds with its verification and evaluation. 
From the enforcement model point of view, the three identified interaction models are suitable. Even if any 
of them matches exactly the data flows of the enforcement model presented in [7], all of them respect the 
definition of the entities and the logical division of their responsibilities. Thus, in all cases DR is focused on 
retrieving data from witnesses, DCP is the entity that receives data from the offence-related stakeholder (the 
Offending vehicle, in this case) and CEA focuses on analysing the evidence, obtaining data from DR when 
necessary to perform this evaluation. 
 
2.2    Requirements 
There are four requirements that must be achieved by the devised solution. Each one is introduced below. 
Correctness. The protocol must enable the creation of a behavior-describing evidence ev for the Offending 
vehicle. Such an evidence must contain one or more testimonies from surrounding vehicles. The protocol must 
enable CEA to validate the aforementioned evidence. For this purpose, the following four conditions must hold: 
Condition 1 (supported evidence). ev has to contain at least one testimony referred to the offence 
identifier offence-id to which the evidence is related. 
Condition 2 (value consistency). Let testimValue be the perception of the behavior-related variable 
included in a testimony appearing in ev. Given that claimedValue is the Offending vehicle's claim on 
that variable, at least one testimony in ev must deviate from testimValue less than a predefined 
parameter confidThreshold.  
Condition 3 (time consistency). All testimonies contained in ev must contain a time mark ttest such that 
toff < ttest <tevid, being toff the time of the offence and tevid the time when the evidence is issued. 
Condition 4 (identity consistency). Every testimony appearing in ev must be signed by a different 
entity. Moreover, there must not be a testimony created by the Offending vehicle. 
 
Confidentiality. Testimonies and evidences should only be available for CEA, apart from their issuers. 
 
Authentic requests for testimonies. Only authentic requests should be processed by receiving vehicles. A 
request is said to be authentic if, on the one hand, it is related to a genuine previous offence notification and, on 
the other, it has not been modified since it was created. 
 
Authentic testimonies. False testimonies should be identified as such by the receiving entity. A testimony is 
considered to be false if the contained data is not reasonable (e.g. a vehicle may not be driven at 600 kph), if its 
sender is not properly identified or if it is not possible to attest that it was present (i.e. near the Offending vehicle) 
at the time of the facts. 
 
2.3    Working assumptions 
The solution devised herein is suitable to work in scenarios where the following five conditions hold. First, a 
secure boot-up process exists through which the appropriate Authority (e.g. a Certification Authority, CA) 
installs all cryptography-related materials into vehicles, particularly in a secure cryptographic device called 
Hardware Security Module (HSM) [8]. This material contains the public-private keypairs along with the 
corresponding pseudonym-based public key certificates (referred to as CertE(t)).  
The second assumption is that a Secure Location Verification service is being executed by vehicles, to 
determine which ones are actually in its vicinity [9].  
The third assumption is that vehicles extract and store the behavior-related data from the received beacons. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that vehicles store during a period p the information provided by in-vehicle sensors 
and the full set of received beacons. This period p is assumed to be greater or equal than the interval between the 
offence and its notification. The storage required to fulfil this assumption is analysed in Section 5.1. 
The last two assumptions are related to beacons. On the one hand, it is assumed that all beacons are signed by 
their issuers. On the other hand, once a vehicle receives a beacon from another one, the latter will also be 
receiving the beacons from the former. In this way, once vehicle A receives a beacon from vehicle B, both are 
sure that the other one may act as its witness.  
 
3   Architecture 
This Section introduces the architecture derived from the model presented in Section 2. The considered 
architecture is depicted in Figure 1, which shows the entities from the model described in Section 2 (marked 
with a broken line) and their technical realization. The participant entities are grouped according to the network 
environment they belong to, either the background or the vehicular one. Section 3.1 describes the background 
environment, whereas Section 3.2 introduces the vehicular one. Section 3.3 describes how both environments 
are connected. The threat model is presented in Section 3.4. Finally, the selection of the interaction model 




3.1  Background environment 
There are three entities in the background environment, namely the Certification Authority (CA), the 
Adjudicator (Adj) and the Evidence Manager (EM). CA manages (i.e. issues, transfers and revokes) 
pseudonymous public key certificates (CertE(t)) that bind a cryptographic key with a pseudonym assigned to the 
vehicle. Thus, CA is the top entity within a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and it is the only entity that is able to 
relate a pseudonym with a real identity. Adj decides about the imposed fine taking into account the evidence 
proposed by the offender. This evidence is previously managed by EM.  
Concerning the evidence verification and adjudication conducted by Adj, both tasks are properly within the 
scope of CEA (recall Section 2). At the light of their respective descriptions, both Adj and EM collectively form 
the task developed by CEA in the model. All entities that form the background environment are static, and so 
they are placed in traditional computation nodes. 
 
3.2   Vehicular environment 
In the vehicular environment, vehicles are connected through a Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET). For this 
purpose, they contain an On-Board Unit (OBU) which provides several communication interfaces (e.g. IEEE 
802.11p, GPRS, etc.), as proposed in the CVIS project [10]. Given that each vehicle is identified by means of 
temporary pseudonyms, each OBU will be able to receive packets that are sent to one of its previous but recent 
pseudonyms to avoid routing problems [11]. 
Apart from the OBU and the HSM (recall Section 2.3), there are two additional in-vehicle devices, which are 
organized considering the OVERSEE architecture [12]. In this way, there exists a Secure Application 
Environment (SAE) where applications reside. From the SAE viewpoint, the proposed protocol is an application 
itself. These applications are transferred to the vehicle by means of a secure dissemination strategy, such as [13]. 
Each vehicle is also equipped with sensors, which give information related to the vehicle current status 
(position, speed) and to its surroundings.  
 
 
Figure 1. System architecture 
3.3 Connection between environments 
The connection between both the background and the vehicular environment is performed through Road Side 
Units (RSUs), which are static nodes placed aside the roads that participate in the VANET. Thus, the RSU task 
involves receiving some data from the Offending vehicle (as it is done, in the enforcement model, by the 
Designated-as-offender Contact Point) and from witness vehicles (as it is done in the enforcement model by the 
Data Requester). All RSUs are connected to EM. Apart from this connection, there exists a resilient channel 
between the vehicular entities and EM, which ensures that packets eventually arrive. One typical environment 
for such a channel is a location-restricted connection like an at-home network. This channel is built periodically, 
for example at a daily basis. The Network Access Point is the entity that enables the communication between 
OBUs and EM. 
 
3.4   Threat model 
Threats on correctness. There are two threats on this issue. First, every message sent through an unreliable 
network (as it is the case of the vehicular one) may be altered or lost. Second, the aforementioned messages may 
be never created, even if mandated by the protocol. One example of this is that OBUs may be compromised in 
such a way that they refuse to participate in the protocol. 
Threats on confidentiality. The eavesdropping threat may happen in the vehicular environment (as usual in 
shared medium networks such as VANETs) as well as in the background network (due to its unreliability). 
Threats on authentic requests for testimonies. A rational attacker may ask for testimonies referred to other 
vehicle as a means of obtaining some information about the victim’s past behavior. 
Threats on authentic testimonies. A false testimony is not beneficial for a well-behaving vehicle, as it may 
lead to legal consequences. However, a rational attacker may be interested in creating testimonies without being 
in the surroundings of the offender, if a reward is given by the offender. Apart from this threat, a malfunctioning 
sensor may originate inaccurate testimonies. 
 
3.5 Selection of the interaction model 
Taking into account the interaction models identified in Section 2.1, in this Section they are comparatively 
analysed. Furthermore, the most suitable one is selected. Without entering into the details of the exchanged 
messages for each particular setting, some conclusions may be reached from the general features of each 
approach. These features are the system scalability, its auditability and its effectiveness (see Table 1). 
 
 
Regarding the system scalability, it must be noted that the decentralized choice is more scalable than the 
remaining approaches, as the workload from EM is reduced. Even considering that EM's computational power 
greatly overcomes that offered by vehicles, the amount of offences that may be detected (at a nation-wide scale) 
at the same time suggests that EM may become a bottleneck. However, the feasibility of this approach should be 
analysed, as several real-time ITS services will be running at the same time over the (constrained) vehicular 
computational device. On the other hand, the combined approach seems to appropriately balance the 
requirements from both parts. However, experimental evaluations with real vehicular hardware will be 
interesting to assess this issue. 
The system auditability measures whether it is possible to reliably determine the operations that have been 
performed to achieve a result. In this context this is a critical feature, as there could be consequences after the 
execution of this mechanism, e.g. call for maintenance due to the lack of response by a witness. In this regard, 
the decentralized approach is less suitable than the remaining options. As all the inter-vehicle communications 
are performed over an unreliable channel, it would be impossible to determine whether the absence of a 
testimony (needed by a certain Offending vehicle) is due to the loss of the request, of the testimony or the 
uncooperative behaviour from the witness [14]. However, a lazy Offending vehicle could claim that it sent a 
request but did not receive a testimony, thus forcing EM to collect it. In this way, the Offending vehicle could 
 Centralized Decentralized Combined (selected) 
System scalability - ++ + 
System auditability ++ - ++ 
System effectiveness + - - + 
Table 1. Analysis of approaches for the testimony collection and evidence generation. The rating for each 
feature ranges from ++ (totally fulfilled) to -- (poorly fulfilled) 
save resources, but it could never be determined whether its claim was trustworthy. The centralized variant is 
similar to the combined approach in this issue, as in both cases EM (which is trusted) takes part in the process, 
using the resilient channel. 
The system effectiveness measures the capacity of the system to create evidences based on testimonies. 
The decentralized approach is again inappropriate for this context. To understand this issue, it is important to 
note that a testimony that is not beneficial for the Offending vehicle could cause it to take reprisals against the 
witness. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that if the Offending vehicle would know the value of the 
testimonies, it will remove the ones that are not favourable to it to avoid wasting resources by creating evidences 
that are against its interests. In this way, a witness holding a non-profitable value for the Offending vehicle 
would never answer in the decentralized choice. Therefore, this approach would prevent these testimonies to be 
managed. On the contrary, the system effectiveness offered by the centralized version and the combined one is 
similar, as both enable a private communication between the EM and every witness. Thus, these unfavourable 
testimonies could be freely sent to EM. They could be used to enable the Authority to complement its proof 
against the offender. For this reason, we consider that the effectiveness of the combined approach (and, 
similarly, of the centralized version) is better than the decentralized one. 
At the light of these considerations, the combined approach is the most suitable one as it addresses 
successfully all the analysed features. For this reason, it will be selected for the development of this contribution.  
 
 
4   Protocol specification 
The proposed protocol is composed by three parts, namely the testimony collection, the evidence generation and 
the evidence verification. Furthermore, there are two exceptional situations caused by data loss that must be 
properly handled, one concerning the offending vehicle and the other related to witnesses. The following 
subsections describe, first, the data structures (Section 4.1) and operations at stake (Section 4.2) and, afterwards, 
each of the aforementioned process parts and the exceptional processes. Figure 2 depicts graphically the whole 
process. As the Offending vehicle will send the request for testimonies to witnesses, in the following it will be 
referred to as the Requester (R), whereas Witnesses will be referred to as Wi. 
 
4.1   Data structures 
Apart from the aforementioned beacons, there are four data structures in this work, namely testimony, request, 
evidence header and evidence. Table 2 summarizes their contents and size. A testimony TestimE1 allows one 
vehicle E1 to describe a behavior-related variable of another vehicle E2 at a time ttest. In order to retrieve a 
testimony, R (i.e. the Offending vehicle) sends a request ReqR(Treq). In order to prevent a third party to 
impersonate R, the request is divided into two parts, each one signed under a different identity, R(toff) and R(treq), 
which are the sender's pseudonyms when the offence is committed and the request is created, respectively. 
Finally, the most complex data structure is the evidence (EvidEM). It is formed by an evidence header, a set of 
supporting testimonies and the time tevid. The header EvidHdrR(Tevid) contains: (1) the identity of the Requester in 
the moment of the evidence (R(tevid)), (2) its claim on its past behavior (called claimedValue), (3) the 
identification of the offence offence-id, (4) the beacons that show that witnesses were in R's surroundings at toff 
(plus their corresponding public key certificates), and (5) the time marks toff and tevHdr.  
 
 
4.2 Cryptographic operations and auxiliary functions 
In the context of this process, public key cryptography is considered. Particularly, to protect the confidentiality 
of messages, public key encryption (noted as EX(t)(M)) and its corresponding decryption (E
−1
X(t)(M)) will be 
applied. On the other hand, to ensure their integrity and data origin authentication, digital signatures (SX(t)(M)) 
and their verifications (S
−1
 X(t)(M)) are in use. 
Apart from cryptographic operations, entities are able to execute seven operations. Vehicles may look for 
behavior-related data from other vehicles through the lookupBehRecord function. They may also retrieve the 
public key certificate of other entity using the lookupCert function. To find suitable witnesses for a given 
vehicle, it may execute the findNeighbours operation. This operation relies on the Secure Location Verification 
service. For each one, it returns the beacon that shows that it was near that vehicle, along with the public key 
certificate for verifying it. Once a testimony is created, the receiving entity can store/retrieve it using the 
storeTestimony/retrieveTestimony operations. In order to check if a claim is supported by a given testimony, 
contains enables finding whether a given value is within an interval (for speeds) or region (for positions). 
As opposed to the previous operations, there is an operation (checkPseudonymsEntity) that is only available 
for the CA. This operation enables determining whether two different pseudonyms belong to the same entity. 
 
Data structure Contents Size (bytes) 
BeaconX(t) SR(t)(R(t), speed, position, t) 4+2+10+2+56 = 74 
ReqR(Treq) (part1, part2) where  
part1 = SR(Treq)(R(toff ), toff ), 
part2= SR(Toff)(offence-id, type), being  
type = position or speed 
Part1 = 4+2+56 
Part2 = 4+1+56 
Total = 123  
TestimWi(Ttest) SWi(Ttest) (Wi(ttest), offence-id, R(toff ),  
[position or speed], ttest) 
4+4+4+[10 or 2]+2+56 =  
= 80 (position testimony) or 
 72 (speed testimony) 
EvidHdrR(Tevid) SR(Tevid) (R(tevid), offence-id, claimedValue, toff,  
BeaconW1(Toff), CertW1(Toff),…, BeaconWn(Toff),  
CertWn(Toff), tevHdr) 
4+4+[10 or 2]+2 + 
+  nw · (74 + 125) + 56 
EvidEM SEM(EvidHdrR(Tevid), SupportingTestim, tevid) where 
SupportingTestim ={TestimW1(Ttest), ... ,TestimWn(Ttest)} 
Size(EvidHdr) + 2 +  
+ nw · Size (Testim) + 56 
Table 2. Summary of data structures: Contents and size. Size values in bold are taken from SAE J2735 standard [3], 
whereas those in italics are from IEEE 1609.2 [15]. Key: nw = number of witnesses 
Figure 2. Proposed evidence generation protocol 
4.3   Testimony collection 
Once a vehicle has received a fine notification, its SAE determines whether it is suitable to ask for evidences to 
challenge the fine. In such a case, SAE extracts the offence identifier and the time of the offence from the 
offence notification to build the request. Furthermore, it determines which behavior-related variable should be 
witnessed, and sends all these data to the HSM to build the request (steps ST1-ST2 in Figure 2). In order to 
determine the vehicles that are candidate to be witnesses, the function findNeighbours is used to establish which 
vehicles were around in the moment of the offence (toff). If there was no single vehicle able to participate as 
witness, it is not possible to create any evidence so the process is stopped. Otherwise, for each of these witness 
vehicles, the request is sent (steps ST3-ST5). Apart from being signed, the request is encrypted as it contains a 
private statement: the Requester, which is currently using pseudonym R(treq), was using pseudonym R(toff) at toff. 
For the same reason, the public key certificate CertR(Toff) is also encrypted. It must be noted that the Requester is 
able to encrypt data for witnesses as it stores, for some time interval, their public key certificates (recall Section 
2.3). 
Once a Witness Wi receives and decrypts the testimony request (ST6), it verifies the signature. The 
verification includes checking the status of Requester’s certificates, which is important to avoid creating 
testimonies for a vehicle which is in an irregular situation. If the verification is correct, it searches within its 
memory any information relevant to R in toff  (ST7). If it exists, a testimony is prepared and sent encrypted to EM 
(ST8-ST9). The encryption is necessary to avoid third parties to be aware of the witnessed value. Significantly, 
R should not realize of this value to avoid retaliation against Wi in case that the testimony is against R's interests. 
However, the public key certificate necessary to verify the signature is not encrypted, as it only contains public 
information. All these data are stored by EM and will be used to create the evidence afterwards. 
 
4.4   Evidence generation 
When R (specifically, its SAE) estimates that all witnesses have had enough time to send their testimonies, it 
starts the creation of the evidence header. For this purpose, it sends to HSMR the offence identifier, the time of 
the offence, the set of designated witnesses (including the beacons and the corresponding public key certificates) 
and its estimation (claimedValue) on the behavior-describing variable (steps ST10-ST11). This header is then 
sent to EM through one RSU, encrypted to prevent other vehicles to learn the status data of witnesses (ST12). 
Again, the public key certificate is not encrypted as it is not confidential. EM then decrypts and verifies the 
evidence header signature. If it is not correctly signed, the evidence header is discarded. Otherwise, EM 
acknowledges it (ST13). It must be noted that if the acknowledgement is not received/verified within a 
reasonable time interval (considering EM processing speed and transmission delays), R starts the corresponding 
Exception Handling procedure (see Section 4.6).  
If the evidence header was correctly received and verified, EM compiles the evidence incorporating the 
corresponding testimonies based on the witness list provided in the evidence header (ST14). If any of them has 
not been received, the Testimony Exception Handling procedure is marked to be started once the witness 
connects using the reliable channel (see Section 4.6). Once all the available testimonies have been collected, the 
process of generating evidence is finished. EM transfers it to Adj, which will verify it before the adjudication 
process (ST15). 
 
4.5   Evidence verification 
The evidence verification process (not shown in Figure 2) is executed by Adj and starts by verifying the 
signatures on the evidence and on each of the beacons contained in the evidence header. It should be noted that 
the signature on the evidence header was already verified by EM during the evidence generation. If any of these 
verifications fail, the whole evidence is discarded, as it is conceptually invalid. This also applies in case that it is 
one beacon which is not successfully verified. It should be noted that the vehicle should have already verified 
this beacon, so an invalid signature indicates that the vehicular devices are not operating regularly. 
In case that all the aforementioned verifications are successful, the checks on the content may start. First, it 
is evaluated if the verification is performed in a moment later than that in which the evidence was created. In 
such a case, each of the testimonies is analysed. If its signature is verified, then several checks are applied over 
the evidence contents: coherence of times, of identities and of the behavior-describing values. Thus, the 
testimony must be created at a reasonable time (i.e. after the fine notification but before the evidence time). It 
should be noted that there is no need to verify if the testimony is issued by one of the witnesses designated by R, 
as it is ensured by the process followed by EM to create the evidence. However, all participants (i.e. R and all 
Wis) must be different among them. To this regard, Adj uses the checkPseudonymsEntity operation to ensure 
that the different pseudonyms are not related to the same entity. In case that an identity fraud is detected, the 
verification process is aborted and the CA is contacted to reveal the identity of the involved entity. Similarly, 
Adj takes the same decision if R is not related to the offence identified by offence−id. 
If all the previous inspections are successful, the operation contains is used to determine whether the 
witnessed value supports R's claim, i.e. belongs to a confidence interval around claimedValue, using a 
predefined confidence parameter confidThreshold. The process is repeated for all beacons contained in the 
evidence header. At the end of this process, Adj determines (1) if the evidence is valid and (2) the amount of 
testimonies that support the offending vehicle’s claim. 
 
4.6 Exception handling 
There are two exceptional situations, caused by the data loss in the communication channel. The first one is the 
absence of an expected testimony, which may happen if the witness did not receive the request, the testimony 
itself was lost or even the purported witness did not know the requesting vehicle. The second one is the lack of 
acknowledgement for the evidence header, which makes the Requester be unaware of the successful starting of 
the evidence generation by the EM. This may be caused because either the evidence header or its 
acknowledgement was lost in transmission. 
In order to manage these situations, a data exchange will take place. In order to avoid the uncertainty caused 
by the channel unreliability, these exception handling mechanisms are run over the resilient channel between the 
vehicular entities and EM (recall Section 3.3).  
Particularly, the Testimony Exception handling procedure consists essentially on the repetition of the 
testimony generation part of the regular process (see box (A) in Figure 2, steps ST6-ST9), which is started by 
request of EM. For this purpose, EM sends all the required data: which offence is related (offence-id), who was 
involved (R(toff )) and when it happened (toff). If there is no response from the vehicle or the testimony signature 
is not correct the vehicle is called for maintenance to verify the vehicular devices. In the extreme situation in 
which there is no valid testimony from any of the witnesses, the evidence would not be created due to the lack of 
supporting data. 
On the other hand, in the Evidence Header exception handling it is the vehicle who repeats the evidence 
header transfer to EM (see box (B) in Figure 2, steps ST12-13). This process only finishes when the 
acknowledgement is successfully received by R. It should be noted that this process may be run by R simply 
because the acknowledgement, but not the evidence header itself, was lost. In such a case, EM would have 
already performed the steps of the Evidence generation algorithm that are beyond the acknowledgement (recall 
Figure 2). Otherwise it is necessary for EM to proceed with these steps. 
 
5   Evaluation 
In this Section, the proposed mechanism is assessed using two ways. First, a performance evaluation is shown in 
Section 5.1. Second, the fulfilment of the imposed requirements is analysed in Section 5.2. 
 
5.1   Performance evaluation 
In this Section, the performance of the proposed approach is evaluated. Due to the unreliability of the vehicular 
network, the high mobility of vehicles and their limited computational resources, the more challenging 
environment is the vehicular one. Therefore, this analysis will focus on how the protocol performs in such an 
environment. Particularly, two indicators will be considered, namely (1) the computational and storage cost for 
vehicles and the impact in the vehicular network (analysed in the three first subsections of this Section) and (2) 
the amount of testimonies per evidence that may be achieved in different road scenarios (analysed in the last 
subsection of this Section).  
 
5.1.1 Vehicular computational and network cost 
Prior to estimate costs, it is necessary to define the computational and network available resources. Concerning 
the computational platform, a commercial vehicular HSM (CycurV2X
2
) is considered. It is estimated that the 
most costly operations are related to cryptographic calculations. Thus, only these operations will be considered 
in this analysis. 
                                                          
2
 https://www.escrypt.com/products/cycurv2x/, last accessed in July, 2013. 
According to figures provided by its manufacturer, CycurV2X performs ECIES encryption of 16 bytes in 27.938 
milliseconds (21.26 ms. for decryption). ECDSA signatures are performed in 7.156 ms. (27.114 ms. for its 
verification, plus a time σv to verify the public key certificate status). Both ECIES and ECDSA are selected for 
compliance to the current standard in security of vehicular networks (IEEE 1609.2, [15]). Related to the network 
resources, a typical inter-vehicle DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communications) network is considered. This 
network has a bandwidth of 6 Mbps [16].  
Table 3 details the cryptographic operations performed by vehicles in the main steps of the process. The 
evidence verification is not included in Table 3 as it is an internal process performed by Adj. Note that the 
provided performance data are referred to 16 bytes, but the data structures have a different size. Thus, it is 
necessary to extrapolate these values for each size, which depends on the cryptographic algorithm design. As 
ECIES is based on a stream cipher, it is reasonable to estimate that there will be a linear relationship between the 
message size and the encryption time. On the other hand, ECDSA is based on SHA-224 or SHA-256 hash 
functions [15]. As it uses a message block size of 64 bytes, which is greater than the data to sign by the vehicle 
(recall Table 2), we will consider that the signature time is the same in all cases. 
Regarding the transmission costs, there are two relevant factors, namely the propagation delay and the 
network transmission one. The propagation delay is assumed to be negligible. To calculate the network 
transmission delay (see Table 3), message sizes from Table 2 are considered. Thus, for the situation in which one 
witness is present (i.e. nw = 1), Equation 1 shows the time taken for the whole process including both processing 
and transmission costs. In case that an exception happens, it is necessary to wait for the resilient channel to be 
available. As it typically means the time to arrive to the physical place where this channel exists, there is no 
reasonable estimation for this value. For this reason, in Equation 1 only the case with no exceptions is 
considered.  
 
Tevid−gen = Tcrypto(Testim. Collection(Req)) + Ttrans(Testim. Collection(Req)) + Tcrypto(Testim. Collection(Wit)) + 
+ Tsend−testimony + Tcrypto(Evid. Generation(Req)) + Ttrans(Evid. Generation(Req)) = (14.31 +1 · 670.51) + 0.47 +  
+(708.1 + 2 · σv) + 0.26 + (341.59 + σv) + 0.52 = 1735.76 +3 σv ms.                      (Eq. 1) 
 
In the previous expression, Ttrans(x) refers to the transmission time shown in Table 3 for each part of the process, 
whereas Tcrypto(x) represents its cryptographic processing (also shown in Table 3). Moreover, time Tsend−testimony 
has been calculated by simply isolating the transmission costs of the testimony from Ttrans(Testim. Collection 
(Wit)), given that the request transmission had been already taken into account in Ttrans(Testim. 
Collection(Req)). According to Equation 1, the process takes around 1.8 seconds (plus 3 times the certificate 
status verification time) to be completed. In this calculation, the transmission of public key certificates (as 
shown in Figure 2) is considered. These certificates have 125 bytes, according to their structure and contents 
defined in IEEE 1609.2 standard [15].  
 
5.1.2. Vehicular storage needs for the witness 
In general words, the witness is forced to (1) perform a connection to EM using the resilient channel at a periodic 
basis (typically, daily) and (2) if necessary, give the pending testimonies using that connection (being called for 
Table 3. Vehicular computational and network costs. Key: ENC/DEC = Encryption/Decryption ; SIG/SIG 
VERIF  = Signature/Sig. verification ; nw = number of witnesses ; σv = certificate status verification time 
Process Data / Cryptographic operations Vehicular proc. 





Request: 2 SIG + nw · ENC 14.31 + nw · 
· 670.51 
0.47 · nw 
Testim. Collection 
(Witness) 
Request: 1 DEC +  2 SIG VERIF 
Testimony: 1 SIG + 1 ENC 
708.1 + 2 · σv 0.73 
Evid. Generation 
(Requester) 
Evid. Header: 1 SIG + 1 ENC 
Evid. Header acknow: 1 SIG  VERIF 
341.59 +  σv 0.52 
Testimony  
exception handling 
Testim. enquiry: 1 DEC +1 SIG VERIF 
Testimony: 1 SIG + 1 ENC 
216.21 +  σv 0.53 
Evidence header 
exception handling 
Evid. Header: 1 SIG + 1 ENC 
Evid. Header acknow: 1 SIG  VERIF 
341.59 +  σv 0.52 
maintenance if it is not performed). For this purpose, vehicles have to store the behavior-related data contained 
in incoming beacons.  
In order to estimate the storage needs, it is necessary to determine the amount of incoming beacons. This 
amount is determined by the density of vehicles that are around a given one in its connectivity range. This 
density ranges from 40 vehicles / km
2
 to 320 vehicles / km
2
 [17]. Taking into account that beacons are sent every 
100 ms. ([3]) and that DSRC range is 1 km., vehicles may be receiving from 400 to 3200 beacons per second. 
For each one, a total amount of 18 bytes is necessary for its storage: 2 bytes for the speed value, 10 bytes for the 
positional (latitude, longitude, elevation) information, 4 bytes for the vehicular identifier and 2 for the time mark 
[3]. This leads to the amount of storage required for one second. Generalizing this value for a one-hour trip 
(which seems to be reasonable for an urban environment), the maximum storage required in the worst case (i.e. 
higher density) is 207,36 Mb. Apart from this information, it is necessary to store the testimonies that have been 
sent in the whole period, as they may have been lost in the vehicular channel. Considering 100 testimonies in the 
aforementioned trip, in the worst case (i.e. position testimonies) they require 2400 bytes of storage –  the digital 
signature included in the testimony does not have to be stored. Taking into account the current state-of-the-art in 
storage technologies, the required capacity seems to be suitable for the vehicular context. 
 
 
5.1.3 Vehicular storage needs for the requester  
In the time interval between the offence and the notification (referred to as tgap), the Requester has to store (1) its 
in-vehicle sensor information and (2) the set of received beacons. The first information is needed to evaluate 
whether the received notification is fair or not based on its perceived driving behavior. The second information 
is required to build the evidence header, as the beacons of purported witnesses have to be included in this 
structure. It should be noted that the second information is different to that required to the witness: in this case, 
not only the beacon sensorial data must be stored, but the whole beacon itself.  
Apart from these data, the Requester has to store the evidence headers that have not been acknowledged. 
However, it is estimated that this storage need is negligible as it is only necessary when evidence is to be created 
and only if the vehicular channel transmission is not successful. 
Concerning the storage of sensorial information, it depends on five factors: the amount of sensors nsen, 
their sampling speed samsp, the size of the sensorial values svali and the time mark of each sample tmark, and 
tgap. Particularly, the requester storage RqSt is given by Equation 2. 
 
RqSt = tgap  / samsp · (tmark + ∑i=0…nsen svali)    (Eq. 2) 
 
For the context of this contribution, only position and speed sensors will be considered (nsen = 2). The 
sampling speed samsp =100 ms. will be taken, which coincides with the beaconing rate assumed in current 
standards. The size of the sensorial value is 2 bytes for the speed value (sval0) and 10 bytes for the positional 
information (sval1). The time mark size tmark is 2 bytes [3]. Concerning the interval tgap, the values 5, 30, 60, 
180 and 300 seconds will be considered. Thus, in the worst case considered (tgap = 300 s.), RqSt =42000 bytes. 
With respect to the storage of received beacons, the calculation follows an analogous reasoning as that 
presented in Section 5.1.2. The difference is that in this case it is necessary to store the whole beacon, but only 
during the period tgap, as former beacons are from vehicles that are not suitable as witnesses. Each beacon 
requires 199 bytes of storage, including its associated public key certificate. Considering this value and the 
previous ones for tgap, in the less favourable context (i.e. the highest vehicular density and the greater tgap), 
Requester stores 191,04 Mb. As it happened with the storage needs for the witness (recall Section 5.1.2), this 
amount is considered as suitable for vehicles, given that they do not have strict space/weight/battery constraints 
for storage devices. 
 
5.1.4  Experimental evaluation 
In order to assess the amount of testimonies per evidence that may be achieved in a road scenario, several 
simulations have been conducted using the NS-2 simulator. Five representative scenarios have been considered, 
namely an urban section from the city of Eichstätt, a highway stretch, a highway crossing section, a secondary 
road and a Manhattan-like map. In each one, 250 vehicles have been simulated over 600 seconds. Every 10 
seconds one randomly chosen vehicle is nominated to be committing a speeding offence, thus launching the 





transmission parameters are derived from the expected performance of DSRC communications including the 
wireless frequency (5.9 Ghz), data rate (6 Mb/s) and reception range (300 m.) [1]. With respect to the routing 
strategy, one-hop broadcast has been chosen. As this is the most basic dissemination strategy (as there is no 
forwarding between nodes), it avoids delays caused by a routing strategy such as [18] or its associated threats 
like black hole attacks [19].  
An intuitive assumption is that the smaller tgap is, the closer (consequently, the more reachable) the Witness 
may be from the Requester. Therefore, this analysis will be focused on determining the effect of tgap in (1) the 
proportion of valid witnesses that are reachable and (2) the amount of testimonies that will be sent for each 
offence. The first indicator shows the relationship between the potential witnesses and the actual witnesses, 
whereas the second one shows the total amount of actual witnesses. In this way, it is possible to characterize 
both the achieved and missed testimonies. 
Figure 3 shows the ratio of available witnesses in each scenario, using 5, 30, 60, 180 and 300 seconds for tgap. 
Except from the highway, around 90 % of the witnesses are available if tgap = 5 s. On the contrary, for tgap = 300 
seconds this proportion drops below 30 %. For the intermediate value of tgap = 60 seconds, all scenarios except 
the Manhattan map allow for a proportion of around 50 %. There are two facts that should be analysed 
separately. First, the highway scenario never offers a ratio higher than 52 %. This is due to the high speed of 
vehicles, along with their potential greater speed differences, making it more probable to get out of range very 
soon. Second, the ratio offered by the Manhattan map gets lower faster than the remaining ones, significantly 
before tgap = 30 seconds. This fact is a consequence of the map definition – once a vehicle turns in a street, it 
starts driving in a perpendicular direction to the other one. 
On the other hand, Figure 4 shows the amount of available testimonies in each scenario considering the 
aforementioned values for tgap. The highway scenario is the most convenient one, as it offers the maximum 
amount of testimonies for all values of tgap. Remarkably, 38 testimonies are collected for tgap =5s. This may be 
explained by the multi-lane feature of this kind of roads, which enables more vehicles to be in range. On the 
contrary, the Manhattan map is the one that offers the lower amount. This fact may be due to the fast dispersion 
of vehicles in this map according to the considered mobility pattern.  
Although the amount of required testimonies to endorse a given claim is up to the Adjudicator, we assume 
that having less than 10 testimonies may be inconvenient. Based on this assumption, this protocol may be used in 
highways for every tgap, whereas in secondary roads it is not suitable for tgap = 300 s. In the Eichstätt and highway 
crossing settings, it is only suitable for tgap < 180 s. It is not suitable for the Manhattan map under this criterion. 
 
  
Figure 3. Ratio of available witnesses depending on tgap 
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 http://sumo.sourceforge.net/, last accessed in July 2013. 
4
 http://www.grc.upv.es/Software/citymob.html, last accessed in July 2013. 
 




5.2   Security requirements analysis 
This Section evaluates whether the imposed requirements are fulfilled.  
Correctness. The verification process enforces that the evidence contains at least one supporting testimony 
(condition 1). In this way, evidences based on false claims by R are removed, as there would be no supporting 
testimonies. Moreover, the semantic checks ensure the consistency between at least one of the testimonies and 
R's claimed value (condition 2). The time consistency (condition 3) is also checked in the verification process. It 
must be recalled that this verification is possible since vehicles are assumed to be synchronized by means of the 
integrated navigation system. The verification process also checks that all pseudonyms at stake belong to a 
different entity (condition 4). Furthermore, it is checked that the Wis identified by R (i.e. listed in the evidence 
header) are the ones that generate the supporting testimonies. 
Concerning the threat of messages never created or lost, the use of a resilient channel contributes to mitigate 
it for all messages except from requests. In such a case, the Testimony exception handling enables collecting the 
testimony even if the request was not received by the witness. Therefore, even if the request is lost, the 
correctness is not threatened. With respect to the message alteration, the use of digital signatures (created in a 
secure environment) makes it possible to detect this threat and to avoid impersonation. 
Confidentiality. All messages exchanged in the vehicular environment are encrypted to its receiver. All 
messages exchanged in the vehicular environment are encrypted to its intended receiver – the request (encrypted 
to each Wi), the testimony and the evidence header (to the EM). Moreover, the created evidence is sent 
encrypted to Adj. These data are securely managed by their respective receivers (SAEWi, EM and Adj, 
respectively). 
Authentic requests. The contents of the request ensure that R is the same entity to which the evidence has to be 
referred, as it has one part digitally signed under its identity (R(toff)). Moreover, another part is signed under its 
current identity (R(treq)), which prevents third parties to issue requests referred to others. The time mark toff 
introduced in the first part counters the potential threat posed by replay attacks. 
Authentic testimonies. The verification process checks the plausibility of a given testimony. In this way, sensor 
errors (accidental or on purpose) are properly handled if these checks offer enough reliability. Therefore, the 
proposed approach satisfies this condition as much as real-life Court situations: witnesses may be good-willing 
but they may offer wrong testimonies due to their perception errors. 
Moreover, the Secure Location Verification process, along with the beacons contained in the evidence 
header, ensure that the witness was present when the offence was committed. As the employed cryptographic 
material is securely loaded into the HSM, and given that this device is firmly attached to the vehicle, only this 
vehicle (which is necessarily different to R) is able to correctly sign a message. 
 
6   Related work 
The small amount of contributions related to evidence generation in vehicular scenarios is described here. The 
most representative ones are related to accident reconstruction. In [1], Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) are 
employed to register all the events produced by the own car. Once the crash has happened, involved vehicles 
send informative beacons to the surrounding vehicles to alert them. The contribution developed here takes into 
account not only the own vehicle's sensor measurements, but also data coming from surrounding vehicles. As it 
is now required for an attacker to compromise (or to collude) surrounding vehicles, the threat is lower than that 
of [1]. 
Evidence generation is also present in the security framework presented by Lin et al. [20]. Their focus is on 
building a secure and private communication protocol that ensures efficient traceability when needed. Thus, 
they consider as evidence a signed message sent by a given vehicle, using ID-based cryptography and group 
signatures as the underlying cryptographic mechanisms. In this paper, the evidence is a signed data structure that 
contains a signed claim by the requesting vehicle and a set of supporting (signed as well) testimonies. 
Furthermore, the cryptographic approach selected is based on public key cryptography, being compliant with the 
IEEE 1609.2 standard [15]. 
Given that the set of witness vehicles for a given one in a certain moment could be seen as a group, previous 
works on group formation and communication could be considered [21, 22]. Given the high mobility of vehicles, 
it could be possible that the intended group members were not present when they are requested. Thus, the use of 
group communications have been discarded in this work, as this choice would not always be suitable. 
 
 
7   Conclusions. Future work 
In this work, a protocol for creating and verifying evidences about a vehicle’s recent behavior has been 
presented. Data employed for creating this evidence is obtained from neighbouring vehicles, which act as 
witnesses. The impact on the vehicular network and computational resources has been illustrated, as well as its 
suitability to representative road scenarios through simulations. 
Ongoing work is focused on considering other alternative protocol designs, beyond the comparison 
presented in this paper. In the future work, the suitability of retransmission strategies and state-of-the-art routing 
algorithms will be studied, as well as other communication technologies (such as GPRS). Moreover, the 
suitability of the protocol in road traffic scenarios with a heavy workload (e.g. greater amount of detected 
offences per second or other coexistent ITS services) will be assessed. Finally, a real-world implementation of 
the proposal is envisioned, to ensure the suitability of the proposal in a practical context. 
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